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PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE. By Thomas Szasz, M.D. Syracuse, New 
York: Macmillan Co. 1965. Pp. 283. $6.95. 
The dust jacket describes this publication as "the definitive in-
dictment by the celebrated author of 'Law, Liberty and Psychia-
try' " of an extraordinary and characteristic abuse of our time-the 
psychiatric denial of the right to trial. In the introduction, Dr. Szasz 
indicates that he is addressing himself to the issue of the ability to 
stand trial, a technical legal ,issue. Dr. Szasz does not discuss this 
topic meaningfully from either a legal or a psychiatric viewpoint. 
Instead, he addresses himself to basic philosophical questions con-
cerning the right of experts to participate in the judicial determina-
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tions. Indeed, he ·questions the fundamental basis of our legal sys-
tem, an inquiry which might or might not be necessary. Should one 
desire such an inquiry, a psychiatric dimension might be of some 
significance. I doubt, however, that such broad social and legal 
problems could be handled adequately from a psychiatric stand-
point. The fact is that Dr. Szasz raises a very broad question, but 
answers it within very narrow confines of psychiatric ethics, as he 
defines them. He considers it unethical for the psychiatrist to par-
ticipate in any activity which does not coincide with the conscious 
wishes of the patient. He makes this issue the central theme of this 
book, as well as of his other writings on law and institutional 
psychiatry. 
Dr. Szasz states: "In the case of adults, I consider that an indi-
vidual's 'best interests' are whatever he himself says they are."1 
, Participation of a doctor in any activity which goes counter to the 
expressed wishes of the individual is evil and immoral. 
The role of the physician employed to examine and pronounce 
dead the bodies of convicts executed in the gas chamber or elec-
tric chair resembles the role of the physician employed in the 
concentration camp. Such a doctor helps agents of the state-
the prison officials-to implement the law. Where there is a 
death penalty, there must be persons who kill convicts, and 
physicians who assist such persons in their work. I do not ques-
tion here the moral legitimacy of the death penalty. While I 
personally lean toward the view that this penalty ought to be 
abolished, it cannot be denied that some reasonable arguments 
can be advanced in its defense. My point is to call attention to 
the social role of the physician assisting in executions: the con-
vict to be put to death is not his 'patient,' whom he helps, but 
his antagonist, whom he harms.2 
Dr. Szasz applies the same reasoning to the doctor who functions 
as an expert witness in any legal proceeding. His "indictment" in-
cludes any and all activities in which psychiatric opinion might 
serve as the basis of an action not approved by the individual whom 
it affects. Dr. Szasz does not question the actions as such, but merely 
the psychiatric participation in reaching the decision. He mentions 
two situations in which he testified in the courtroom concerning 
the defendant's ability to stand trial. In each instance, Dr. Szasz in-
formed the attorneys that if his findings were contrary to the defen-
dant's wishes, he would withdraw from the case. "We agreed that I 
would act as Mr. Hoffer's psychiatrist if, after examining him, I 
considered him mentally fit to stand trial; if I did not consider him 
fit, I would withdraw from the case."8 Dr. Szasz does not hesitate to 
express a categorical opinion that an individual is able to stand 
I. P. 57. 
2. P. 58. (Emphasis added.) 
3. P. 145. 
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trial, provided that his testimony is identical with the defendant's 
goals. 
The criteria for competence to stand trial are legally defined; 
psychiatry enters this problem only secondarily, in response toques-
tions framed in legal terms. In spite of this, Dr. Szasz implies that 
psychiatrists are infringing upon the right of individuals to stand 
trial. 
The problem facing law and psychiatry has been a failure of 
communication, with the resulting lack of meaningful cooperation 
in matters where interaction between law and psychiatry is inevi-
table. Nevertheless, Dr. Szasz states clearly that it is his intention 
to make dialogue between psychiatry and law impossible. He ques-
tions the fundamental bases of law, yet he displays a remarkable 
lack of familiarity with basic legal procedures. He assumes that 
psychiatric opinion holds great controlling influence in the court-
room, and a mere reading of statutes or decisions might well lead 
to such an assumption. In reality, however, the reverse seems true. 
Those familiar with the courtroom situation are well aware that 
psychiatric testimony can be compelling and relevant. Nevertheless, 
the judge or jury will often disregard this testimony, even if the 
other side fails to present contrary psychiatric testimony. 
Dr. Szasz does not wish to eliminate opinion testimony from the 
courtroom; however, he does want this testimony to be limited to 
lay witnesses; eliminating the expert. He says that "the criminal 
trial is, so to speak, the judge's 'ballgame.' "4 Since he is the umpire, 
he certainly ought to know who can and cannot play the game. 
Competence to stand trial means competence to play the role of a 
defendant, and, indeed, it is a legal standard which is determinative. 
Why then cannot the judge determine whether the defendant is 
competent to stand trial? Dr. Szasz goes on to say that the judge 
could determine this on his own by "talking to the defendant or 
proceeding with the trial and observing the defendant's conduct in 
the courtroom." He claims that: · 
[T]he judge does neither. Instead he delegates the task of assess-
ing what kind of game-player the defendant is to psychiatrists. 
But this means that, merely because of a "suspicion" about the 
defendant's mental status, he is removed from the category of 
an ordinary human being, with whom judges can converse-
and is placed in the category of the insane, who, having been 
demoted from person to patient, must be examined by 
psychiatrists.5 · 
The facts upon which Dr. Szasz bases his conclusions are inaccu-
rate. The fact is that the judge does speak to the defendant; the 
4-. P. 2:1. 
5. P. 28. 
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judge often is the fact-finder and frequently overrules psychiatric 
opinion in favor of conclusions based upon his own observation.0 
No one would disagree that there have been considerable short-
comings in our administration of statutes concerning the ability to 
stand trial. These shortcomings derive mostly from inadequate medi-
cal facilities, poor representation of impoverished defendants, and 
occasional deliberate abuse. Dr. Szasz quotes from an article by 
Professor LaPlante discussing an instance in which a psychiatrist 
was used to trick a defendant into making self-incriminating state-
ments which were used to convict him. Dr. Szasz then reaches the 
remarkable conclusion that the forensic psychiatrist is "the defen-
dant's covert adversary." He refers to forensic psychiatrists as 
"persons who have more or less freely chosen to earn a living by 
depriving some man of the right to be tried." Evidently, Dr. Szasz 
feels that the existence of an abuse invalidates the basic principle. 
Throughout the book, Dr. Szasz indicates that the statutes gov-
erning competency to stand trial are a weapon used by prosecutors 
to deprive citizens of liberty in situations where a conviction could 
not be obtained. To this end, the prosecutor is assisted by unscru-
pulous psychiatrists. Furthermore, "the psychiatrist (or any other 
'behavioral expert,' such as the psychologist) can play no part in 
this affair-either as decision-maker or as provider of 'expert 
opinion.' "7 In this manner, Dr. Szasz creates his own strawman, 
which he then proceeds to attack with devastating success. 
The main weakness of the book is its scholastic character, which 
makes it an anachronism in the scientific world of today. The main 
value of modern psychiatry derives from the empirical approach to 
which it is committed, but Dr. Szasz is highly non-clinical in his 
handling of the issues involved. He freely admits, and it is abun-
dantly obvious, that he lacks familiarity with the subject of his 
polemic. The book and its conclusions suffer from the author's 
disregard of the experience and research of other workers in the 
field. He does quote other authors on occasion, but this is done 
selectively and often out of context. 
The title of the book may lead some to believe that it deals with 
psychiatry, but it offers neither psychiatric theories nor psychiatric 
insight. 
Dr. Szasz s·ees the role of psychiatry in the administration of 
justice in Onvellian terms. He even speaks of a "psychiatric state.'' 
One can hardly argue with the main thesis of this book; one can 
merely accept or reject the convictions of Dr. Szasz. 
Emanuel Tanay, M.D., 
Assistant Professor of Psychiatry 
Wayne State University 
6. Cf. People v. Wingeart, 371 Mich. 264 (1963). 
7. P. 255. 
